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EVERYONE AGREED ON SOMETHING: HOW NEW JERSEY’S TEACHNJ ACT
PUTS TESTING BEFORE STUDENTS, AND FIRING BEFORE TEACHING

Daniel T. Paxton

I.

INTRODUCTION
The TEACHNJ Act has never been about New Jersey’s students. 1 But its proponents in

Trenton have always made sure to discuss the Act as if it were. Nonetheless, the Act focuses its
attention squarely on teachers. Without any particular rationale, the Act makes it more difficult for
teachers to attain tenure, and much easier to scrutinize and to fire teachers once they have tenure.
However, the Act’s scheme for achieving its actual goals lacks effective evaluation procedures and
runs afoul of well-established due process rights. In short, the TEACHNJ Act does not do what it
says it does, is not particularly good at what it actually does, and is without adequate procedural
safeguards.



J.D. candidate, expected 2016, at Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. 2001, Rutgers College. I would like
to thank Professor Marc Poirier for his guidance.
1
Although the stated goal of the TEACHNJ Act is to “raise student achievement by improving instruction,” the
statute’s focus is the employment conditions of teachers, including its main goal of tenure reform. Guide to the
TEACHNJ Act, NEW JERSEY DEP’T OF EDU., http://www.nj.gov/education/AchieveNJ/intro/TeachNJGuide.pdf (last
updated June 2014). The New Jersey Department of Education stated that:
[a]t its core, TEACHNJ reforms the processes of earning and maintaining tenure by improving
evaluations and opportunities for professional growth. Specifically:

Tenure decisions are now based on multiple measures of student
achievement and teacher practice as measured by new evaluation
procedures.

Lengthy and costly tenure hearings are shorter, focused on process only,
and less expensive.

Educator feedback and development is more individualized and focused
on students.
Id. See also Jarrett Renshaw, Gov. Christie Signs Teacher Tenure Overhaul Bill, THE STAR LEDGER (Aug. 2, 2012),
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/08/gov_christie_signs_ teacher_ten.html (quoting State Senate President
Stephen Sweeney as saying “We can’t have the bad ones in schools anymore. One bad teacher is one bad teacher
too many.”).

1

On May 23, 2011, State Senator Teresa Ruiz, a Democrat from Essex County, told The
Star Ledger that she would introduce the Teacher Effectiveness and Accountability for the
Children of New Jersey Act (“the Act”) later that week.2 In its original form, Senator Ruiz’s bill
effectively ended tenure in New Jersey.3 The bill eliminated all due process for tenure removal.4
It authorized local principals to revoke a teacher’s tenure after two years of ineffective ratings if
the principal felt that the teacher was not following an individualized improvement plan.5 The bill
also included a longer probationary period for teachers prior to tenure, a teacher evaluation tool
based on student test scores, a two-tier teacher rating system of effective and ineffective, and a
professional development piece as well.6 Despite the bill’s evident focus on firing teachers,
Senator Ruiz told the Ledger, “I approached this bill through the lens of supporting and elevating
the profession, but most importantly with a vision of the children whose futures are at stake.”7
Senator Ruiz was not alone in her zeal to upend the teaching profession. This incarnation
of the TEACHNJ Act came fast on the heels of separate, similar education reform legislation
introduced by Republican State Senator Joe Kyrillos and supported by Republican Governor Chris
Christie.8 Senator Kyrillos’ bill differed in the main from Senator Ruiz’s bill in its lack of
professional development for teachers.9 Prior to Senator Kyrillos’ bill, the governor himself had

2

Jessica Calefati, State Sen. Teresa Ruiz Pushes New Teacher Tenure Reform Bill, THE STAR LEDGER (May 23,
2011), http://www.nj.com/news/ index.ssf/2011/05/nj_democrat_pushes_new_tenure.html.
3
See Teacher Effectiveness and Accountability for the Children of New Jersey (TEACHNJ) Act, S. 2925, 214th
Leg. (June 6, 2011), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/S3000/2925_I1.HTM [hereinafter Sen. Ruiz
TEACHNJ Proposal].
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Calefati, supra note 2.
8
Id.
9
Compare Sen. Ruiz TEACHNJ Proposal with School Children First Act, S. 2925, 214th (May 19, 2011)
(sponsored by Sen. Joseph M. Kyrillos, Jr.), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/S3000/
2881_I1.PDF.
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proposed teacher reforms mandating merit pay and ending last-in, first-out job protections.10
Echoing Senator Ruiz, a spokesman for Senate Republicans invoked the children: “Reforming
tenure is absolutely essential to making sure every student is being taught by an effective
educator.”11 This rhetoric and the accompanying wave of legislative proposals suggest that New
Jersey’s children were in dire straits.
Yet New Jersey’s children were quite well educated at the time.12 According to the
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), in 2011, the year TEACHNJ was first introduced,
New Jersey’s fourth graders ranked fourth and second in the nation in mathematics and reading,
respectively.13 Eighth graders ranked third and second in those subjects.14 In 2010, the New Jersey
Education Association (NJEA) noted, and Politifact confirmed, that New Jersey’s public high
school students achieved the highest average Advanced Placement test score in the entire

10

See Matt Bai, How Chris Christie Did His Homework, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/02/27/magazine/27christie-t.html?_r=0. The profile noted:
The war between Christie and the union has two fronts, so closely interrelated that it’s hard to
separate them. First there’s the fight over budgeting issues like pensions and benefits. And then
there’s the “year of education reform,” as Christie has proclaimed 2011, in which he intends to
push his case for merit pay, charter schools and the abolition of teacher tenure — all of which are,
of course, anathema to the union.
Id.
11
Calefati, supra note 2.
12
New Jersey State Profile, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/states/ (last
visited Apr. 17, 2015). In 2013, New Jersey fourth, eight, and twelfth graders scored higher than the national
average on both Math and Reading standardized tests. Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. The rankings are based on student scores on the National Assessment of Educational Progress. Diane Ravitch
described the NAEP scores:
The only test scores that can be used comparatively…because [NAEP] is a no-stakes test. No one
knows who will take it, no one knows what will be on the test, no student takes the full test, and
the results are not reported for individuals or for schools. There is no way to prepare for NAEP,
so there is no test prep. There are no rewards or punishments attached to it, so there is no reason
to cheat, to teach to the test, or to game the system.
DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR: THE HOAX OF THE PRIVATIZATION MOVEMENT AND THE DANGER TO AMERICA’S
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 125 (2013) [hereinafter RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR].

3

country.15 Without regard for this success, the governor and both parties in the legislature were
clamoring for tenure reform.
On August 6, 2012, Gov. Christie signed the revised TEACHNJ Act into law.16 The Act
had been passed unanimously in both the Senate and the Assembly.17 This version of the bill saw
input from both the governor and the NJEA.18 Governor Christie went so far as to thank the union
he had previously referred to as thugs for the important role they played in the bill’s success.19 An
NJEA spokesman said, “Everyone agreed that we needed to do something.”20 State Senate
President Stephen Sweeney, a Democrat from Gloucester County, added, “We can’t have the bad
ones in schools anymore. One bad teacher is one bad teacher too many.” 21 The national media
lauded the bill’s passage as an example of Governor Christie’s ability to make tough compromises,
even in a state where the teachers’ union is quite strong.22 Amidst all the praise, then Mayor of

Erin O’Neill, NJEA Claims New Jersey Public School Students Have Best Advanced Placement Scores in Nation,
POLITIFACT, Sept. 4, 2011, (http://www.politifact.com/new-jersey/statements/2011/sep/04/new-jersey-educationassociation/njea-claims-new-jersey-public-school-students-have/ (“The NJEA claims the state’s public school
students have the best Advanced Placement test scores in the country. PolitiFact New Jersey compared the average
AP test scores for students across the nation and found New Jersey’s public school students rank first.”).
16
2012 Bill Tracking N.J. S.B. 1455.
17
Salvador Rizzo, Sweeping N.J. Teacher’s Tenure Bill Passes Legislature, Heads to Gov. Christie’s Desk, THE
STAR LEDGER (June 25, 2012), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/06/sweeping_nj_teachers_tenure_bi.html.
18
Id.; Press Release, Testimony by NJEA President Barbara Keshishian, Senate Budget and Appropriations
Committee S-1455 (June 8, 2012), https://www.njea.org/news/2012/06/18/testimony%20by%20njea%20president
%20barbara%20keshishian. Keshishian mentioned “extensive discussions over the last several months.” Id.
19
Renshaw, supra note 1, (“The fact of the matter is nothing gets done without their input, support and their help. I
know it’s not everything they wanted to have happen, and it wasn't everything that I wanted to have happen.”). The
public thank you of the teachers’ union was much different from 2011 when Gov. Christie stated:
I believe the teachers in New Jersey in the main are wonderful public servants that care deeply. But
their union, their union are a group of political thugs. They should have taken the salary freeze.
They didn't and now, you know, we had to lay teachers off. They chose to continue to get their
salary increases rather than be part of the shared sacrifice.
Bradley Blackburn, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie Calls His State’s Teachers Union ‘Political Thugs’,
ABCNEWS (Apr. 6, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/jersey-governor-chris-christie-calls-teachers-unionpolitical/story?id=13310446.
20
Rizzo, supra note 17.
21
Renshaw, supra note 1.
22
See John Martin, N.J. Gov. Christie signs bipartisan reform of nation’s oldest teacher tenure law, CNN’s
SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT BLOG (Apr. 18, 2012, 2:20 PM), http://schoolsofthought.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/07/n-j-govchristie-signs-bipartisan-reform-of-nations-oldest-teacher-tenure-law/ (“Groups that have traditionally been at odds
worked together to craft and pass the bill sponsored by both Democratic and Republican lawmakers. Not a single
member of New Jersey’s bicameral legislature voted against it.”); Kate Zernike, Christie Signs Bill Overhauling Job
15
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Newark Cory Booker and Education Commissioner Chris Cerf criticized the bill for not going far
enough to reduce teachers’ job protections.23 In a statement, Senator Ruiz again looked to the
children: “By strengthening our professionals, we will ensure that our students have the best
teachers in the classroom so that all children—regardless of their background, their ZIP code, or
their socio-economic status—will have the opportunities they deserve for educational
excellence.”24
Despite Senator Ruiz’s public comments focusing on students, and the TEACHNJ Act’s
official purpose to “raise student achievement by improving instruction through the adoption of
evaluations that provide specific feedback to educators” and “inform personnel decisions,” this
legislation’s actual target is teacher job protections.25 This note will critique the TEACHNJ Act’s
changes in teacher evaluations and tenure proceedings, and provide recommendations for solving
those issues. Part II will provide a brief history of tenure and teacher evaluation in the United
States generally, along with an explanation of its creation in New Jersey. Additionally, Part II will
survey recent legislation affecting these topics, including a discussion of Vergara v. California,
wherein a California trial court declared that state’s tenure laws unconstitutional. Part III will
appraise the likelihood that the Act’s changes in teacher evaluations will meet the Act’s goals.
Part IV will analyze the constitutional issues raised by the new tenure removal scheme, along with
the Office of Administrative Law’s contrasting procedures.

Guarantees for Teachers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/07/nyregion/christie-signsbill-overhauling-teacher-tenure.html?_r=0 (“The new law suggests how much the landscape has changed on revising
education, and on tenure, long among the most contentious issues for teachers’ unions and legislatures.”); Cf. Steve
Kornacki, What Chris Christie Didn’t Tell You, SALON (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.salon.com/2012/08/29/
what_chris_christie_didn%E2%80%99t_tell_you/ (“Again, Christie can claim some credit here for pushing the issue
aggressively in the public square and making it a priority.”).
23
Rizzo, supra note 17; Renshaw, supra note 1.
24
Rizzo, supra note 17.
25
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-118 (West 2014).
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II.

TENURE: PAST, PRESENT, AND NEW JERSEY
A. Tenure’s Past and Present
Tenure began as a result of the recognition that civil service employees needed protection

from the vicissitudes of politics.26

In the late nineteenth century, the National Education

Association (NEA) thought of tenure as a means of shielding teachers from parents, administrators,
and boards of education.27 The topic headlined the organization’s first conference, held in Chicago
in 1887.28 By the early twentieth century, the NEA espoused tenure as an essential component of
all teachers’ contracts.29 In 1946, the NEA stated a formal position on tenure embracing both the
removal of incompetent teachers and the retention of skilled ones.30 The implementation of tenure
continued across the country, firmly rooting its protections in most school districts by the late
1960s.31

26

Patricia L. Marshall, Debra V. Baucom & Allison L. Webb, Do You Have Tenure, and Do You Really Want it?,
71 THE CLEARING HOUSE: A JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL STRATEGIES 302, 302-05 (1998). See also DANA
GOLDSTEIN, THE TEACHER WARS: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S MOST EMBATTLED PROFESSION, (2014) [hereinafter
GOLDSTEIN, THE TEACHER WARS] (“But the history of American public education shows that teachers are uniquely
vulnerable to political pressures and moral panics that have nothing to do with the quality of their work.”).
27
Marshall, Baucom & Webb, at 302; M. J. Stephey, A Brief History of Tenure, TIME MAGAZINE, Nov. 17, 2008,
http://content.time.com/ time/nation/article/0,8599,1859505,00.html (“Just as steel and auto workers fought against
unsafe working conditions and unlivable wages, teachers too demanded protection from parents and administrators
who would try to dictate lesson plans or exclude controversial materials like Huck Finn [sic] from reading lists.”).
28
Stephey, A Brief History of Tenure, supra note 27 (“The start of the tenure movement paralleled similar labor
struggles during the late 19th century….In 1887, nearly 10,000 teachers from across the country met in Chicago for
the first-ever conference of the National Educator’s Association, now one of the country’s most powerful teachers’
unions.”).
29
Marshall, Baucom & Webb, supra note 26, at 302.
30
Id.
31
Id.
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In recent years, education reformers have attacked tenure, characterizing it as intentionally
inefficient.32 They claim that tenure shields incompetent teachers.33 They say that it is so difficult
to remove a teacher that administrators prefer to allow bad teachers to continue working rather
than begin the process.34 Reformers attack the tenure removal process for expense, saying that
even if a district begins gathering the information necessary to fire a teacher, the costs are
prohibitive, often citing numbers as high as $450,000.35

The New Jersey Department of

Education’s own explanatory material on the TEACHNJ Act calls tenure hearings lengthy and
expensive.36 Since tenure is inefficient, difficult to remove, cumbersome, and expensive, the
argument goes, it needs to be scrapped.
These arguments have persuaded some state legislatures to become skeptical of tenure
protections.37 Laws in Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Michigan, and New Hampshire have
all drastically weakened tenure.38 Generally, these laws alter tenure by reducing the amount of
process necessary for removal, linking significant portions of evaluations to student test scores,
and increasing probationary periods.39 Florida and Idaho’s laws have explicitly eliminated tenure,
while Colorado’s law essentially does so without acknowledging it.40

Steven Brill, The Teachers’ Unions’ Last Stand, THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/05/23/magazine/23Race-t.html?pagewanted=all; Stephey, supra note 27.
33
Brill, supra note 32; Stephey, supra note 27.
34
Vergara v. State of California, No. BC484642 2014 WL6478415 (Cal. Super. Aug. 27, 2014).
35
Stephey, supra note 27; Vergara at *5. It is difficult to find credible information supporting this figure. It is
repeated often on various anti-tenure advocacy websites and by newspapers on that side of the issue as well. But
aside from conclusory statements asserting the claim, the author has not been able to find a disinterested and open
accounting of the cost of tenure proceedings.
36
New Jersey Department of Education, “Guide to the TEACHNJ Act,” accessed 10/16/14.
37
Laura McNeal, Total Recall: The Rise and Fall of Teacher Tenure, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 489, 496
(2013); Vergara at *6.
38
McNeal, supra note 37, at 496; See Ala. Code § 16-24C-4 et seq. (2013); S.B. 10-191, 67th Gen. Assemb., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2010); S.B. 736, 2011 Sess. (Fla. 2011); S. B. 1327, 61st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2012) (The
Students Come First Bill was repealed by voters on Nov. 6, 2012. See Vol. 13-1 Idaho Admin. Bull 35 (Jan. 2,
2013)); Mich. Comp. Laws § 38.83 et seq. (2013); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 273-A:4 (2010 & Supp. 2012).
39
McNeal, supra note 37, at 496
40
McNeal, supra note 37, at 500, 496.
32
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Reformers have not limited their campaign to legislation. Students Matter, a pet project of
Silicon Valley entrepreneur David Welch, uses the courts to advance its agenda.41 Welch’s group
recruited nine public school children and paid the law firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher 1.1 million
dollars to challenge California’s tenure removal process, two-year probationary period, and
seniority rule.42 The case became Vergara v. California.43 It ended with a trial court judge
declaring California’s tenure laws unconstitutional and calling on the legislature to fix the
situation.44
In Vergara, the court found that these statutes have a serious and negative effect on
students’ fundamental right to equal education, and that they disproportionately affect poor and
minority students.45 As a result, the court applied strict scrutiny to the statutes and the two-year
probationary period was struck down for its unfair treatment of both students and teachers.46 The
court held that the tenure removal process was so burdensome in its complexity, length, and cost

Adolfo Guzman-Lopez, The Lawsuit’s Called Vergara, but the Name You Should Know is Welch, SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.scpr.org/blogs/education/2014/04/25/16461/the-lawsuit-scalled-vergara-but-the-name-you-shou/. Welch made sure to mention the children when discussing his organization,
though he declined to discuss the amount of money he had poured into it:
Despite not having a background in public education, [Welch] said he had no choice but to take on
the issue. “About four years ago, I got to the point where there was [sic] too many children that
were being harmed in the system,” he said. “If I had the capability of doing the right thing to make
life better for someone else or for my society, then I try to do it.” In interviews, Welch wouldn’t
say how much money the case has cost him. It’s no doubt been substantial. Tax records for 2012
show he loaned Students Matter nearly 1 million dollars that year alone, half of which was spent on
public relations.
Id. See also http://studentsmatter.org/.
42
Guzman-Lopez, supra note 41; Vergara at *2.
43
Vergara at *1.
44
Vergara at *7. Regarding a legislative response, Judge Rolf M. Treu stated:
Under California’s separation of powers framework, it is not the function of this Court to dictate or
even to advise the legislature as to how to replace the Challenged Statutes. All this Court may do
is apply constitutional principles of law to the Challenged Statutes as it has done here, and trust the
legislature to fulfill its mandated duty to enact legislation on the issues herein discussed that passes
constitutional muster, thus providing each child in this state with a basically equal opportunity to
achieve a quality education.
Id.
45
Id. at *4.
46
Id. at *5.
41
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as to be unnecessary.47 Calling the logic of the “last-in, first-out” seniority statute “unfathomable,”
the court stated that this part of California’s tenure statute was unconstitutional as well.48
United States Secretary of Education Arne Duncan hailed the decision, calling it “an
opportunity….to build a new framework for the teaching profession that protects students’ rights
to educational opportunities while providing teachers the support, respect and rewarding careers
they deserve.”49 Students Matter is considering similar actions in Connecticut, Kansas, Maryland,
New Mexico, New York, and Oregon.50 As it stands, tenure protections are under attack in both
legislatures and the courts.
B. Tenure in New Jersey
In New Jersey, tenure became the law in 1909.51 As of 2012, New Jersey’s tenure law had
not changed significantly over the more than one hundred years of its existence.52 Teachers earned
tenure after a probationary period of three years of consecutive, satisfactory service in the same

47

Id. at *6.
Vergara at *6.
49
Press Release, U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan, Statement from U.S. Secretary of Education Arne
Duncan Regarding the Decision in Vergara v. California (June 10, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/statement-us-secretary-education-arne-duncan-regarding-decision-vergara-v-california. Secretary Duncan’s
discussion of the decision invalidating teacher tenure laws focused on students:
For students in California and every other state, equal opportunities for learning must include the
equal opportunity to be taught by a great teacher. The students who brought this lawsuit are,
unfortunately, just nine out of millions of young people in America who are disadvantaged by laws,
practices and systems that fail to identify and support our best teachers and match them with our
neediest students. Today’s court decision is a mandate to fix these problems. Together, we must
work to fix public confidence in public education….My hope is that today’s decision moves from
the courtroom toward a collaborative process in California that is fair, thoughtful, practical and
swift. Every state, every school district needs to have that conversation.
Id.
50
Jennifer Medina, Judge Rejects Teacher Tenure for California, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2014, http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/us/california-teacher-tenure-laws-ruled-unconstitutional.html.
Both sides expect the case to generate more like it in cities and states around the country….While
the next move is still unclear, [Students Matter] is considering filing lawsuits in New York,
Connecticut, Maryland, Oregon, New Mexico, Idaho and Kansas as well as other states with
powerful unions where legislatures have defeated attempts to change tenure laws.
Id.
51
Rizzo, supra note 17; Renshaw, supra note 1.
52
New Jersey School Boards Association, The New Tenure Law: What Board Members Need to Know, 36 SCHOOL
BOARD NOTES 4, Aug. 14, 2012 (referring to the TEACHNJ Act as “the first substantial reform of teacher tenure
laws in over a century.”).
48

9

school district.53 During the probationary period, teachers could be fired without cause, that is,
without hearings as to the reasonableness of the grounds for their dismissals.54
Before TEACHNJ was enacted, once teachers earned tenure, they were afforded due
process before districts could fire them. To prevail in an attempt to remove a tenured teacher, the
district had to prove one of four reasons for dismissal: inefficiency, incapacity, conduct
unbecoming a teaching staff member, or some other just cause. The procedures were as follows:
presentation of charges to the local Board of Education (the Board) by the superintendent,
certification of charges by the Board, filing of charges with the Commissioner of Education (the
Commissioner) by the Board, a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (the ALJ) from the

53

SCHOOL OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES—IMPROVEMENTS—PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS, 2012 NJ
Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 26 (SENATE 1455) (WEST).
54
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:27-3.2 (West 2014); Donaldson v. Board of Education, 320 A.2d 857, 861-62 (1974). The
New Jersey Supreme Court held that a non-tenured teacher is entitled to a statement of reasons for dismissal upon
request, but not a formal hearing. Justice Jacobs stated:
The teacher is a professional who has spent years in the course of attaining the necessary education and
training. When he is engaged as a teacher he is fully aware that he is serving a probationary period and may
or may not ultimately attain tenure. If he not reengaged and tenure is thus precluded he is surely interested
in knowing why and every human consideration along with all thoughts elemental fairness and justice suggest
that, when he asks, he be told why….The plaintiff does not urge before us that, in addition to a statement of
reasons, she was entitled to a formal hearing before the board. For the present purposes, we assume that no
such hearing was required although we hasten to suggest that a timely request for informal appearance before
the board should ordinarily be granted even though no formal hearing is undertaken.
Id. See also E. GORDON GEE & PHILIP T. K. DANIEL, LAW AND PUBLIC EDUCATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 390
(4th ed. 2009):
In fact, the vast majority of employees fall under the ‘at-will doctrine,’ meaning that persons can be
terminated for good reason, bad reason, or no reason. This was the ruling in the case of Castro v.
New York City Bd. Of Educ., 777 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), where a nontenured teacher
challenged his non-renewal of contract, claiming a pre-termination hearing was required. The court
concluded that the teacher served ‘at will’ in his non-tenured status and failed to prove that he was
dismissed for a constitutionally impermissible purpose.
Id.; Teachers’ Rights: Tenure and Dismissal, FINDLAW (May 12, 2015, 7:14 PM), http://education.findlaw.com/
teachers-rights/teachers-rights-tenure-and-dismissal.html:
Prior to attaining tenure, a probationary teacher may be dismissed at the discretion of the school
district, subject to contractual and constitutional restrictions. Laws other than those governing
tenure will apply to determine whether a discharge of a teacher is wrongful. If a probationary
teacher’s dismissal does not involve discrimination or does not violate terms of the teacher’s
contract, the school district most likely does not need to provide notice, summary of charges, or a
hearing to the teacher.
Id.
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Office of Administrative Law (the OAL), and a final decision on the ALJ’s ruling by the
Commissioner.55
C. TEACHNJ’s Changes to Tenure
The TEACHNJ Act makes significant changes to tenure.

The Act increases the

probationary period leading up to receiving tenure from three years to four.56 Administrators may
base up to fifty percent of teachers’ evaluations on student test performance.57 This rule is satisfied
through the creation of student growth objectives (“SGOs”) by individual teachers. 58 The Act
mandates that summative evaluations include four ratings: highly effective, effective, partially
effective, and ineffective.59 When a teacher receives two consecutive ratings of ineffective, or a
rating of partially effective followed by ineffective, the superintendent must file tenure charges.60
This requirement relieves the superintendent of the discretion to decide whether to file charges that
she possessed under the old law. In the case of a teacher who receives ratings of ineffective
followed by partially effective, or partially effective in two consecutive years, the superintendent
retains that discretionary power.

When faced with a teacher receiving those ratings, the

superintendent may file charges or may defer by filing written evidence of exceptional
circumstances.61 Thereafter, the Board may file the charges with the Commissioner within thirty
days, unless the Board decides that the evaluation process was not followed.62

55

SCHOOL OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES—IMPROVEMENTS—PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS, 2012 NJ
Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 26 (SENATE 1455) (West).
56
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:28-5(a)(3)(b)(1) (West 2014).
57
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-123(b)(4) (West 2014).
58
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-123(b)(2) (West 2014); N.J.A.C. § 6A:10-2.4(b)(1)-(6); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:104.2(e)(1)-(6) (LexisNexis 2015).
59
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-123(b)(1) (West 2014).
60
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.3(a)(1) (West 2014).
61
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.3(a)(2) (West 2014).
62
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.3(a)(2)(b) (West 2014).
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The Act completely removes the OAL from the tenure hearing process. In its stead, the Act
places compulsory, binding arbitration.63 Once the Commissioner has the charges, the teacher has
fifteen days to file a response.64 The Commissioner has ten days to submit the charges to an
arbitrator.65 A hearing with the arbitrator will then take place within forty-five days of the
assignment of an arbitrator.66 The arbitrator then has forty-five days from the start of the hearing
to issue a decision.67 The arbitrator may consider only the following four issues: if the evaluation
failed to substantially follow the evaluation process, if there is a mistake of fact in the evaluation,
if the charges were brought only as a result of discrimination, nepotism, political affiliation, union
activity or other conduct prohibited by state or federal law, and if the district’s actions were
arbitrary and capricious.68 The costs of the arbitration are capped at $7,500 and are borne by the
state.69
The Act received the support of the Democratic legislature, the Republican governor, and
the state’s major teachers’ union, the New Jersey Education Association. 70 The legislative and
executive branches in Trenton had not seen this level of accord at any time since Governor
Christie’s election.71
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N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-16 (West 2014).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-16 (West 2014).
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N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-16 (West 2014).
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N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(b)(1) (West 2014).
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N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(d) (West 2014).
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N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.2(a)(1)-(4) (West 2014).
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N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(b)(2) (West 2014).
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See Rizzo, supra note 17.
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See, e.g., Todd B. Bates, One thing N.J. residents agree on is partisanship, THE DAILY JOURNAL.COM (Jun. 6,
2011), http://archive.thedailyjournal.com/article/20110606/NEWS01/106060317/One-thing-N-J-residents-agreepartisanship:
Last week’s war of words between Republican Gov. Chris Christie and the Democrats didn’t move
the two sides closer to harmony. The Democrats criticized Christie for using a state police helicopter
to fly to his son’s baseball game and then to a political dinner. The governor, in turn, called one
assemblywoman [sic] a ‘jerk’ over the issue and the Democrats said Christie ‘is unable to discuss
things like a grown-up.’”
Id.; Christie Weighs Budget Cuts Amid Spat With ‘S.O.B.’ Democrat, NEWSMAX (Jun. 27, 2012, 2:54 PM),
http://www.newsmax.com/Politics/AMERICAME-BGVTTOP-BNALL-BNCOPY/2012/06/27/id/443681/.
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III.

EVALUATIONS AND TESTS, DUE PROCESS AND HEARINGS
A. Teacher Effectiveness and Student Testing
The TEACHNJ Act compels schools to use teacher evaluations that mandate reliance on

student test scores. This requirement ignores the primary role socio-economic status plays in
student achievement, fails to provide specific feedback to teachers about instructional practice, and
allows teachers to game an easily circumvented system.72 Additionally, high stakes tests (such as
the one New Jersey will use, the Partnership for Assessment of Readiness for Colleges and Careers
(PARCC)) are prone to statistical errors that make them unsuitable for evaluating teachers.73
Student test scores do not measure teacher effectiveness. According to the Act, up to fifty
percent of a teacher’s evaluation must reflect student performance on standardized tests.74

Governor Chris Christie called a New Jersey Senate Democrat and ‘arrogant S.O.B.’ over the failure
to guarantee a tax cut in the Legislature’s $31.7 billion spending plan, without saying whether he’ll
veto it. Christie’s comment referred to Senator Paul Sarlo, who heads the budget panel. The
Republican said he ‘got fooled’ in swapping his income-levy rollback for property-tax rebates, citing
a six-month delay and conditions set by lawmakers.
Id.
72
See ANYA KAMENETZ, THE TEST: WHY OUR SCHOOLS ARE OBSESSED WITH STANDARDIZED TESTING—BUT YOU
DON’T HAVE TO BE 65 (2015). Kamenetz explains the multiple ways economic struggle affects student
achievement as follows:
Poor kids may not get the same quality sleep because they share a bed or sleep on a couch. They
may come to school without breakfast. Their vision goes uncorrected. They are likely to have less
educated parents who own fewer books and talk to them less from the time they are infants—a gap
that’s been estimated at 30 million words by the time they start kindergarten. They are more likely
to suffer from ‘toxic stress’—a parent in jail, abuse, trauma, or risk of homelessness—that interferes
with their ability to concentrate day to day and can distort their brain development over time.
Id. Kamanetz goes on to quote the findings of Dr. Michael Freemark, a professor of pediatrics at Duke University,
whose review of state test scores for students in Chapel Hill and Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina demonstrated that
“‘85 percent of variability in school performance is explained by the economic well-being of a child’s family, as
measured by eligibility for subsidized lunches.’” Id. See also DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT
AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM: HOW TESTING AND CHOICE ARE UNDERMINING EDUCATION 258 (rev. and expanded
ed., 2010) [hereinafter RAVITCH, DEATH AND LIFE] (“Teachers can have a profound influence on their students, but
on average, what families do or don’t do influences academic outcomes even more.”).
73
Diane Ravitch, Schools We Can Envy, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (Mar. 8, 2012),
http://www.nybooks.com/ articles/archives/2012/mar/08/schools-we-can-envy/) (citing DANIEL KROESK,
MEASURING UP: WHAT EDUCATIONAL TESTING REALLY TELLS US (2008)). Prof. Ravitch mentions the findings of
several researchers in this vein: “[E]xperts like Robert L. Linn at the University of Colorado, Linda DarlingHammond at Stanford, and Helen F. Ladd at Duke, as well as a commission of the National Research Council, have
warned about misuse of standardized tests to hold individual teachers accountable with rewards or sanctions.” Id.
74
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-123(b)(4) (West 2014); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:10-4.1(d)(1)-(4) (LexisNexis 2015);
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:10-4.1(e) (LexisNexis2015).
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Research has long settled that the most important factors that influence a student’s success as
measured by testing are socio-economic—family income, health, neighborhood characteristics
etc.75 For example, a student born to a wealthy family or to educated parents will usually
outperform peers on standardized tests.76 If a student’s family is both wealthy and educated, she
is even more certain to excel on such assessments.77 To the extent that a teacher’s effect on a
student’s test score is quantifiable, teaching only accounts for between one and fifteen percent of
the outcome.78
In this way, the Act substantially evaluates teachers using a metric they do not control. The
result of the Act’s focus on testing is a measurement that reflects, for the most part, the student’s
socio-economic status, and not her teachers’ effectiveness. Since test scores have little to do with
instructional ability, the half of the Act’s new evaluation system that districts may base on them
does not provide teachers with worthwhile feedback. Rather, this part of the evaluation only
suggests to teachers information to which they are often already privy, i.e., the student’s situation
at home.
In addition to this redundancy, the fifty percent testing component of the Act’s teacher
evaluation scheme falls short of the Act’s goal of “providing specific feedback.”79 A student’s

75

See Dana Goldstein, Can Teachers Alone Overcome Poverty? Steven Brill Thinks so, THE NATION,
http://www.thenation.com/article/162695/can-teachers-alone-overcome-poverty-steven-brill-thinks-so; Kamenetz
supra note 72; RAVITCH, DEATH AND LIFE, supra note 72.
76
See Kamenetz, supra note 72; RAVITCH, DEATH AND LIFE, supra note 72.
77
See Kamenetz, supra note 72; RAVITCH, DEATH AND LIFE, supra note 72.
Unfortunately, every testing program—be it the SAT, the ACT, NAEP, or state scores—shows a
tight correlation between family income and scores: Children from affluent families have the highest
scores, and children from poverty have the lowest scores. On the SAT for reading, students whose
family income is in the lowest bracket (under $20,000) have an average score of 437, whil students
whose family income is in the highest bracket (over $200,000) have a mean score of 568; the gap is
as large and as regular in mathematics. The same pattern is found on international assessments.
Id. at 286.
78
See AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASS’N, ASA STATEMENT ON USING VALUE-ADDED MODELS FOR EDUCATIONAL
ASSESSMENT (2014); Goldstein, supra note 75.
79
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-118(a) (West 2014).
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performance on one test on one day, or even on twelve tests on twelve days over the course of an
entire school year, reveals only a snapshot of that student’s performance on those occasions.80 It
offers no explanation regarding what component of the teacher’s practice affected the outcome.
Teachers may employ several different strategies over the course of a single lesson to help
students. Test scores do not say which ones work. They cannot discern whether it was a teacher’s
cooperative learning activities or her individual conferencing that were effective. Nor do they
address why they were so. This silence of test scores regarding the efficacy of particular
instructional strategies, frustrates the Act’s stated aim to provide specific feedback. Rather than
providing guidance, test scores leave teachers to guess at which aspect of their practice works. For
this reason, fully half of the Act’s evaluation scheme fails at its stated purpose.
The above discussion shows that test scores reflect socio-economic factors more than
teacher efficacy, and specify nothing in particular regarding teaching strategies.

Of equal

significance is the indifference of test scores to individual students.81 The possible reasons in a
student’s life for her success or failure on any given day are myriad. An idiosyncratic love of
Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s novels, or a sibling’s skilled tutelage in trigonometry might contribute
to a fine grade on one occasion, just as an unexpected family upheaval or a twenty-four hour virus
may sabotage the grade on another. Tests ignore the impact of the individual student’s emotions,

80

See Ravitch, Schools We Can Envy, supra note 73.
See RAVITCH, DEATH AND LIFE, supra note 72, at 162-63. Prof. Ravitch discusses the problem of student
responsibility and test scores, along with that of family responsibility and test scores, with specific reference to
testing under the No Child Left Behind Act (“NCLB”):
One problem with test-based accountability, as currently defined and used, is that it removes all
responsibility from students and their families for the students’ academic performance. NCLB
neglected to acknowledge that students share in the responsibility for their academic performance
and that they are not merely passive recipients of their teachers’ influence. Nowhere in the federal
accountability scheme are there measures or indicators of students’ diligence, effort, and motivation.
Do they attend school regularly? Do they do their homework? Do they pay attention in class? Are
they motivated to succeed? These factors affect their school performance as much as or more than
their teachers’ skill.
Id.
81
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her likes and dislikes, and her intrinsic motivation or lack thereof. These facets of a student’s life
profoundly influence her ability to learn.82 But half of the Act’s evaluation scheme relies on a
measurement that is unable to account for such concerns, while at the same time being in part
encumbered by them. Just as teachers cannot control the socio-economic status of a student, they
cannot alleviate a student’s personal difficulties. Even so, the Act’s testing mandate rates teachers
as if a student’s personal obstacles did not exist. The Act has created a teacher evaluation regime
based on student performance that ignores the agency of the student. Teachers’ evaluations should
not be subject to the accidents of students’ lives.
B. TEACHNJ and Cheating
Since teachers lack the ability to improve the most essential components of a student’s testtaking ability (i.e., her socio-economic status, her personal motivation, etc.), and because under
the Act that ability constitutes half of teachers’ evaluations, teachers will find other ways to survive
this threat. In short, high-stakes testing often leads to widespread cheating by teachers and
administrators.83 Major district-wide cheating scandals have come to light in Georgia, Nevada,
and Washington D.C.84 In each case, the district tied the evaluation of teachers to the performance
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RAVITCH, DEATH AND LIFE, supra note 72, at 162-63.
See GOLDSTEIN, THE TEACHER WARS, supra note 26, at 227. Goldstein lists several disturbing findings regarding
the relationship between high-stakes testing and cheating:
Increasingly, there was evidence that a significant number of unscrupulous administrators and
teachers nationwide had responded to the higher stakes attached to state-level standardized tests—
evaluations, bonus pay, and public release of data—by cheating. [Jack Gilum and Marisol Bello of
USA Today] studied six…states and found over sixteen hundred examples of probable test score
manipulation between 2002 and 2010. (The newspaper would have almost certainly found even
more cheating had it not zeroed in on only the most suspicious test score leaps….For example: At
one Gainesville, Florida, elementary school, math proficiency rates jumped from 5 percent to 91
percent in three years.) A subsequent investigation by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution discovered
196 school districts across the country with suspicious test score gains.
Id. See also RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR, supra note 14, at 148-150 (discussing Washington D.C.’s former
superintendent, Michelle Rhee, and the “major cheating scandal” caused by Rhee’s “relentless pressure to raise the
passing rates on tests”).
84
See Michelle Rindels, 3 School Staffers On Leave In Vegas Cheating Probe, THE HUFFINGTON POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/17/clark-county-cheating-teachers_n_5166780.html; RAVITCH, REIGN OF
ERROR, supra note 14, at 148-150; Alan Blinder, Atlanta Educators Convicted in School Cheating Scandal, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/02/us/verdict-reached-in-atlanta-school-testing83

16

of students on tests.85 These states put teachers in an untenable situation: their ability to pursue a
calling was subordinated to the socio-economic and emotional conditions of their students. Faced
with these grim odds, teachers and administrators aided students in a variety of unethical ways to
keep their own jobs.86
The TEACHNJ Act penalizes teachers for student test performance in ways similar to the
testing regimes in Georgia, Nevada, and Washington D.C.

This correspondence augurs

corresponding results for New Jersey. Teachers faced with the possibility of losing their
livelihoods may act to protect themselves by resorting to cheating.
One aspect of the design of the TEACHNJ Act makes it rather easy for teachers to
manipulate their evaluations. Under the Act, teachers’ evaluations involve Student Growth
Objectives.87 These instruments allow teachers, in consultation with administrators, to determine

trial.html?_r=0 (discussing a state investigation that concluded “that cheating had occurred in at least 44 schools and
that the district had been troubled by ‘organized and systemic misconduct,’” and resulted in the conviction of eleven
public school educators on charges of racketeering). The presiding judge, Judge Jerry W. Baxter of Fulton County
Superior Court, ordered most of the teachers and administrators jailed immediately, and took the opportunity to
scold them thus: “I don’t like to send anybody to jail….But they have made their bed, and they’re going to have to
lie in it, and it starts today.” Id. Atlanta Superintendent Beverly L. Hall had been charged as well, but she died
before she could stand trial. Id. Prior to coming to the Atlanta public schools in 1999, Dr. Hall, who investigators
said “created a culture of fear, intimidation and retaliation” that allowed “cheating—at all levels—to go unchecked
for years,” Id., was the superintendent of the public schools in Newark, NJ. See John Mooney, DOE Releases Two
More Reports on School Cheating Scandal, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/13/
04/07/doe-releases-two-more-reports-on-school-cheating-scandal/.
85
See Rindels, supra note 84; RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR, supra note 14, at 148-150; Blinder, supra note 84.
86
New Jersey has already experienced cheating scandals under the previous testing regime. See Vernal Coleman,
Woodbridge school principal encouraged cheating on standardized test, state says, NJ.COM (Mar. 20, 2015),
http://www.nj.com/middlesex/index.ssf/2015/03/woodbridge_district_elementary_school_principal_ch.html.
[The Office of Fiscal Accountability and Compliance’s] investigation alleges that during the 2010
and 2011 NJ ASK examinations, [Woodbridge elementary school principal Cathie] Bedosky
encouraged test examiners and proctors to interfere with the independent work of students taking
the assessment, failed to properly train examiners and utilized unqualified staff to fulfill test
examiner positions….Previous investigations by DOE Office of Fiscal Accountability and
Compliance have implicated other township elementary teachers in testing scandals. In 2012, five
Woodbridge administrators [two elementary school principals and three teachers] were accused by
state investigators of cheating, or encouraging students to cheat on state standardized tests.
Id. Mooney, DOE Releases Two More Reports on School Cheating Scandal, supra note 84 (discussing reports from
the New Jersey Department of Education finding that in two East Orange elementary schools “several teachers
either breached proper security protocols or may have coached students to change answers”).
87
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-123(b)(2)-(6) (West 2014); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:10-2.4(b)(1)-(6) (LexisNexis 2015);
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:10-4.2(e)(1)-(6) (LexisNexis 2015).
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which students must improve, how much they must improve, and on what assessments.88 Teachers
may set different goals for different students based on various and multiple starting points.89 For
instance, an SGO might state that eighty percent of students who turned in seventy-five percent of
the homework assignments will reach the targeted score on this test. If, for example, only forty
percent of the entire class hands in seventy-five percent of the homework assignments, the teacher
has just excluded more than half the class from the equation. This SGO has shielded the teacher
from their scores because the part of the class that does not turn in enough homework is also likely
to be the students in need of the greatest assistance on tests.
In the 2014-15 school year, teacher-created SGOs will account for twenty percent of
teachers’ evaluations.90 Given the draconian penalty of tenure removal for unsatisfactory test
scores, teachers have a strong incentive to rig this part of the Act’s evaluation method to their
advantage.
C. Tenure Proceedings
As part of its scheme to reduce teachers’ job protections, the Act removed tenure hearings
from the OAL and placed them in the hands of appointed arbitrators.91 This reduction in tenure
protections does not address the Act’s stated goal of increasing student achievement through better
instruction. In addition, the new plan subjects the tenure hearing process to undue political
influence. The Act’s method for the appointment of the Commissioner’s panel of arbitrators
hearing tenure charges creates a patronage system that allows interested parties to adjudicate tenure
proceedings, as long as they do so according to the wishes of their benefactors.
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N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-123(b)(2)-(6) (West 2014); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:10-2.4(b)(1)-(6) (LexisNexis 2015);
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:10-4.2(e)(1)-(6) (LexisNexis 2015).
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N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-123(b)(2)-(6) (West 2014); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:10-2.4(b)(1)-(6) (LexisNexis 2015);
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:10-4.2(e)(1)-(6) (LexisNexis 2015).
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New Jersey Department of Education, Student Growth Objectives: Developing and Using Practical Measures of
Student Learning, 3, (2014).
91
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-16 (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(a) (West 2014).
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i. Dismissal, Property Rights, and Interested Arbitrators
In its stated attempt to increase the success of students through better instruction,
TEACHNJ’s new evaluation and removal procedures make it easier to dismiss teachers. However,
there is no evidence that reducing tenure protections leads to better instruction or improved student
achievement.92 States and districts that have previously made similar changes to their tenure rules
have not seen significant increases in student test scores.93 Moreover, there is no guarantee that
qualified replacements will be available to replace dismissed teachers.94 In fact, firing teachers for
inefficacy makes recruiting new teachers more difficult.95 So the greater ease with which districts
can lay off teachers under TEACHNJ will not solve the problems its proponents claim exist. These
measures may even cause other problems.
The new removal procedures are not only likely to be ineffective as far as improving
instruction goes. By empowering interested parties to hear tenure cases, they also corrupt the
independence, and therefore the legitimacy, of the proceedings overall. The New Jersey School
Boards Association (NJSBA) and the New Jersey Principals and Supervisors Association (NJPSA)
will appoint fourteen of the twenty-five arbitrators on the panel.96 The state’s two teachers unions,
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RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR, supra note 14, at 129.
Howard Blume, Schools’ next test is getting tenure ruling to pay off in class, L.A. TIMES (June 11, 2014, 10:08
PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-teacher-decision-lawsuit-20140612-story.html (quoting Jesse
Rothstein, associate professor of public policy at the University of California, Berkeley, noting that regarding states’
tenure reform measures, “There’s no evidence yet that these changes have had a beneficial effect”).
94
Ray Fisman, How To Build a Better Teacher, SLATE (Oct. 20, 2014, 9:37 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
business/the_dismal_science/2012/07/how_to_improve_teaching_new_evidence_that_poor_teachers_can_learn_to_
be_good_ones_.html; GOLDSTEIN, THE TEACHER WARS, supra note 26, at 230.
Even if test scores were a flawless reflection of student learning and teacher quality, there is no
evidence that the new teachers who replace the bad teachers will be any better—it is practically
impossible to predict, via demographic traits, test scores, grades, or pathway into the profession,
who will become an effective teacher.
GOLDSTEIN, THE TEACHER WARS, supra note 26, at 230.
95
Jesse Rothstein, Taking On Teacher Tenure Backfires, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com
/2014/06/13/opinion/california-ruling-on-teacher-tenure-is-not-whole-picture.html?hp&rref=opinion&_r=1
(“[F]iring bad teachers actually makes it harder to recruit new good ones, since new teachers don’t know which type
they will be.”).
96
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(a) (West 2014).
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the NJEA and the American Federation of teachers (AFT), will appoint the remaining eleven
arbitrators.97

Therefore, most of the arbitrators deciding tenure charges will owe their

appointments to organizations whose members file and certify tenure charges, i.e., school boards
and administrators.98 Just as dangerous for impartiality is the prospect of arbitrators with deep ties
to the unions who appointed them hearing tenure charges.
The Act’s delegation of the authority to appoint the officials responsible for tenure
adjudication to interested private organizations fails to satisfy the requirements of procedural due
process. This appointment method, along with the lack of an explicit dismissal mechanism, vitiates
the impartiality necessary to make tenure proceedings constitutionally sound.

The OAL’s

appointment and dismissal procedure for ALJs, on the other hand, demonstrates proper regard to
procedural due process standards.
Teachers, in New Jersey and elsewhere, have procedural due process rights with regard to
tenure. Procedural due process rights attach when 1) the government acts 2) against an individual
3) to deprive her of life, liberty, or property.99 Tenure removal meets the first two elements because
the government acts through its agents (a superintendent and a board of education) to initiate the

97

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(a) (West 2014).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.3(a)(1) (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN § 18A:6-11 (West 2014). The names of the
arbitrators and which organizations appointed them are difficult to find. David Saenz Jr., Deputy Press Secretary at
the New Jersey Department of Education, provided the following information. The NJPSA designated arbitrators
are Stephen M. Bluth, Daniel F. Brent, Edmund G. Gerber, Joseph Licata, and Ernest Weiss. The NJSBA
designated arbitrators are Scott E. Buchheit, Dennis J. Campagna, Walter H. DeTreux, Mattye M. Gandel, Robert C.
Gifford, David L. Gregory, Randi E. Lowitt, Arthur A. Riegel, and Joel M. Weisblatt. The NJEA designated
arbitrators are Melissa H. Biren, Howard C. Edelman, Carol F. Laskin, James W. Mastriani, Michael J. Pecklers,
Gerard G. Restaino, Tia Schneider Denenberg, and Robert T. Simmelkjaer. The AFT designated arbitrator is
Timothy J. Brown. The Commissioner appointed Joyce M. Klein and Alan A. Symonette. E-mail from David
Saenz, Jr., Deputy Press Secretary, New Jersey Department of Education, to author (May 11, 2015, 9:05 PM) (on
file with author).
99
U.S. Const. amend. V and XIV; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 257 (1970) (extending constitutional safeguards
in the form of administrative hearing rights to welfare recipients prior to termination of benefits due to ineligibility
by a government welfare agency).
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process against a particular teacher. The third element is met because the Supreme Court has said
that teachers have a property right in tenure.100
Teachers’ property rights in tenure originate in Board of Regents v. Roth. In that case, the
Supreme Court stated that “[t]o have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have
more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it.
He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”101 The Court clarified that the
Constitution does not create property interests, “[r]ather, they are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to
those benefits.”102
The Court held that the teacher in Roth had no property interest entitling him to due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because he had been hired using a series of one-year
contracts.103 By contrast, New Jersey’s tenured teachers have the proper independent source of
state law that secures their tenure benefits and teachers’ entitlement to them.104 Therefore, they
must receive due process when the State seeks to deprive them of tenure.
Procedural due process protections require that an impartial authority carries out
adjudications.105 The TEACHNJ Act’s new scheme for adjudication undermines impartiality by
allowing the appointment of biased arbitrators. Arbitrators are chosen by the most interested
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Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
Id. at 577.
102
Id. at 572.
103
Id. at 579. See also Perry, supra note 100 (holding that a teacher in the Texas state college system was entitled to
a hearing and notice of grounds for his non-renewal if the college had a de facto tenure system and the teacher was
entitled to tenure under it).
104
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:28-1 et seq. (West 2014); Spiewak v. Board of Education, 447 A.2d 140, 144 (1982)
(holding that N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:28-1 to 18A:28-18 make tenure a mandatory term and condition of
employment that supersedes contractual terms).
105
See Judith K. Meierhenry, The Due Process Right to an Unbiased Adjudicator in Administrative Proceedings, 36
S.D. L. R. 551, 552 (1991).
101

21

parties in tenure hearings: school boards (the NJSBA), administrators (the NJPSA), and teachers
(the NJEA and the AFT).106
Each one of these organizations has the responsibility to represent its constituents. In order
to do so, they will appoint arbitrators sympathetic to the interests of their members. By the time
the tenure removal process makes it to an arbitrator, members of both the NJSBA and the NJPSA
have recorded their support for removal.107 It follows that the NJSBA and the NJPSA will appoint
arbitrators who are likely to support the decisions of its members to strip teachers of tenure. In the
same fashion, NJEA and AFT will both appoint and maintain arbitrators who have demonstrated
fealty to their own ranks. So it is possible that some teachers may present their cases before
arbitrators who are biased in their favor (however, given the appointment breakdown, it is more
probable that teachers will stand before an authority who owes her power to the representative of
the other side of the proceeding, i.e., the NJSBA or the NJPSA). The existence of this direct
connection between the adjudicator and one side of the dispute renders impartiality unlikely.
Moreover, the Act’s reticence on the removal process for arbitrators suggests an even
greater problem for the impartial authority obligation.

The Act provides only that the

Commissioner may remove an arbitrator if she fails to meet the time constraints for the proceedings
without asking for an extension.108 That is, the Act explains how arbitrators are hired, but not how
they are fired. If the Commissioner cannot do it, who can? Both the Act and the regulations are
silent on this important issue. The answer may be that the organizations who appoint are the
organizations who remove. In that case, school boards and administrators, as well as teachers,
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N.J. STAT. ANN. §18A:6-17.1(a) (West 2014).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.3(a)(2) (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.3(a)(2)(b) (West 2014).
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could dismiss arbitrators who do not rule as they see fit. This scenario forecloses the possibility
of disinterested adjudication.
ii.

Time and Costs

The TEACHNJ Act’s removal of tenure proceedings from the OAL in favor of binding
arbitration might not solve the problems of time and cost efficiency. The findings of New Jersey’s
non-partisan Office of Legislative Services (“OLS”) show that one of the major claims reformers
make to support the need for the Act’s gutting of tenure protections—that removal costs hundreds
of thousands of dollars—is not adequately addressed by the Act. As to the claim that firing a
tenured teacher takes too long, the Act’s provisions may not prevent lengthy proceedings.
With regard to expense, OLS has stated that it is possible that costs associated with tenure
charges will rise as a result of an expected increase in the number of such cases.109 The OLS also
reported that the new evaluation system used to facilitate the firing of tenured teachers will cost
the state fifty-four million dollars to implement, while noting that this number does not include the
costs of implementation borne by local school districts.110
It is also not clear that the new scheme will make tenure proceedings go faster. The Act
allows for extensions at the request of the arbitrator.111 No restrictions exist regarding the number
of extensions that the Commissioner may grant. Furthermore, the Act provides that the arbitrator’s
decision must be granted within forty-five days of the start of the proceedings.112 No language in
the Act defines the “start” of the proceedings (do they begin when the parties first discuss dates to
appear before the arbitrator, when the parties actually appear before the arbitrator, when testimony
is taken, or at some other point?). Whatever the speed of that component of the process, judicial
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review of an arbitrator’s decision remains available.113 In this way, the arbitrator’s decision lacks
finality, so the proceedings may continue.
At the least, there is uncertainty as to the ability of the Act to curb the purported
inefficiencies of the prior scheme.
IV.

THE NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE CENTRAL PANEL
SOLUTION TO TEACHNJ
New Jersey’s OAL provides the best forum to adjudicate tenure proceedings. The OAL’s

organization as a central panel allows for judicial independence while inspiring public
confidence.114 Its ALJs have clear appointment and dismissal procedures in place, thus avoiding
the due process and impartiality issues created by the TEACHNJ Act.
A. The Central Panel
In twenty-four states and the federal system, administrative law cases are handled by a
department within the agency that will also be one of the litigants in those controversies.115 The
agency staffs this department with its own administrative law judges. 116 These ALJs hear and
decide contested cases (though their decisions are usually subject to review by the
Commissioner).117

States attempt to ensure the independence of these agency ALJs by

implementing various protections, usually concerning salary and removal. At the federal level,
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) guards that independence in part by taking the hiring
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and firing of administrative law judges completely away from the agencies.118 Two separate
agencies, the Officer of Personnel Management and the Merit Systems Protection Board, handle
these tasks.119
By contrast, New Jersey, along with twenty-five other states as well as the cities of
Chicago, New York City, and the District of Columbia, has established stronger protection for
judicial impartiality in administrative proceedings.120 All of these states and cities have created a
free-standing central panel.121
A central panel is an independent office of administrative law.122 It has a cadre of ALJs
who adjudicate contested cases involving other agencies within the central panel’s jurisdiction.123
The purpose of the central panel is to provide both the public and the agencies due process and fair
adjudications.124 For example, if the state environmental protection agency and a developer have
a dispute, it will be heard by an ALJ in the central panel, rather than by one of the agency’s own
employees. The separation of both sides from the adjudicator promotes both facial and substantive
fairness.125 Some central panels have effectively expanded their jurisdiction by taking cases that
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agencies voluntarily refer to them.126 Executive action, rather than legislation, has also increased
jurisdiction on the part of central panels.127
Central panels support adjudicatory professionalism, decisional independence, and public
confidence.128 They are also more efficient and less costly than their intra-agency counterparts.129
Most importantly for this Note, the central panel structure is free of the due process and impartiality
concerns created by TEACHNJ’s arbitrator appointment method.

The way that ALJs are

appointed to New Jersey’s OAL demonstrates this crucial difference.
B. New Jersey’s Administrative Law Judges
The appointment and removal of ALJs to New Jersey’s central OAL suffer from none of
the due process shortcomings of the arbitrator selections instituted by the TEACHNJ Act. Unlike
that Act, New Jersey law openly explains the procedure for hiring ALJs. The OAL’s statutorily
created method for these appointments and removals is transparent and subject to democratic
controls. For these reasons, New Jersey should return to using the OAL for tenure proceedings.
The appointment of ALJs involves both the executive and the legislature.130 With the
advice and consent of the Senate, the governor appoints the ALJ.131 The ALJ’s term is set.132 Her
initial employment is for one year, after which the ALJ may be reappointed by the governor to a
four year term.133 Following this period, the governor, again with the advice and consent of the
Senate, may reappoint the ALJ to terms of five years.134
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The mechanisms for disciplining and removing ALJs are clear and independent.135 The
Director and Chief Administrative Law Judge (“the Director”), who is also appointed by the
governor with the advice and consent of the Senate,136 evaluates ALJs focusing on three areas of
their performance as judges: competence, productivity, and demeanor.137 The law commands the
Director to consider several aspects of those parts of an ALJ’s work, including impartiality. 138
Notably, the methods the ALJ uses in arriving at her decisions may be used in her evaluation, but
not the results of those methods.139
The differences between the methods of appointment at the OAL and in the TEACHNJ
Act could not be more pronounced. ALJs in the central panel are appointed in an open public
forum. TEACHNJ’s arbitrators are picked behind closed doors. The OAL’s ALJs are appointed
by politically accountable people, i.e., the Senate and the governor. TEACHNJ’s arbitrators are
backed by organizations that the public cannot join, lobby, or change. Under the OAL’s method,
this open procedure by two politically accountable branches of the government repeats for each
ALJ after the first year, and then again after four years, and every five years thereafter. In this
way, an ALJ’s appointment is subject to predictable and regular democratic control. There is no
democratic control of any kind built into the TEACHNJ Act of the school boards’, the
administrators’, and the unions’ arbitrators.
V.

CONCLUSION
The TEACHNJ Act’s attack on tenure does not solve the issues attributed to the law as it

existed prior to the Act’s passage. The Act imposes testing to evaluate teachers, despite testing’s
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inability to do so effectively, and in the face of voluminous evidence denouncing the practice. The
Act’s evaluation scheme ignores the socio-economic conditions and the diligence of the students
it tests. The Act’s harsh punishments for lagging test scores pushes teachers and administrators to
cheat. Moreover, the Act infringes on constitutionally protected procedural standards by allowing
the parties to tenure proceedings to choose their own adjudicators.
To ensure fair and effective process for teachers, tenure proceedings must be restored to
the Office of Administrative Law, examined independently of student achievement considerations,
and changed only insofar as such changes comport with the goals of that office.
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